Between Kant and Hegel - Free will

One issue driving the free-will controversy is the distinction between historicism and anti-historicism. Historicism posits distinctively different circumstances for decision-making. Thus, the capabilities for free will change. 

Anti-historicism claims that the human capability for free will does not change regardless of circumstances. 

Hegel links freedom with reason in the context of historical change. For Hegel, as for Kant, blaming someone for something depends on how much he knows about the factors involved and how much he can be expected to know. State of mind or blame refers to what the actor knew about the case at a certain time. 

Kant demands compliance with principles and norms, eg categorical imperative, rules, etc. Hegel, however, does not simply link free will to responsibility, he also connects freedom to reason through expanding understanding. Conceptual truth is not a given framework as it is for Kant, concepts and the connections between concepts change and move just as history changes to higher and higher forms of freedom, so does reason.

A lacuna emerges here because Hegel is positing that freedom is a good for everyone, that everyone is seeking freedom, thus no one denies the claims of freedom. However, this is not the case and would place Hegel back on the anti-historicist side with Kant. Power and ambition dominate the present scene over against virtues, or Kant’s good will, which degenerates into the moral forms of false consciousness. 

False consciousness to Hegel are conceptual frameworks which both illuminate and misrepresent. The framework at issue is individualism. Where Kant represents the moral life in universal and necessary terms, the limitations of individualism are concealed. Hegel calls this situation the spiritual zoo where each individual finds himself assessed by others in terms of his role in their pursuit of freedom, and free will. Each person becomes the fate of another. To deny these impersonal forces and one’s own disillusionment (each of us however must be disillusioned or we would live our lives in an illusion), individuals turn back to virtue and take up arms against others and the world. In doing this, they claim they were just minding their own business and following the law as obedient citizens!

Hegel identifies this absoluteness in free will, duty, as excusing self-seeking, rivalry and ruthlessness which disguises the objective truth. The Kantian followers do not differentiate the commodities or entities involved in their deliberate acts, it is no concern of theirs whether the principles they obey affect things or other humans!

I’ll cut it off here with a notion from Thoreau. “Sometimes, we have a duty to disobey.”

Amoralism

Nietzsche chastised morality as untruth.

With the decay of religion and its palpable philosophical secularizations, restrictive prohibitions lost their inherent authority, their substantiality. It became ludicrous to pronounce prayers or commitment to a church with sincerity, especially as witnesses to 20th century horrors which were permitted by the major religions.

 In the 19th century, material production was still so undeveloped that it could be proclaimed with some reason that there was not enough to go round.  Anyone who did not criticize political economy as such, had to cling to the limiting principle which was then articulated as unrationalized appropriation at the expense of the weak.  The objective conditions have changed.  It is not only the social non-conformist or even the narrow-minded bourgeois who must see restriction as superfluous in face of the immediate abundance.  The implied meaning of the master-morality, that he who wants to live must fend for himself, has in the meantime become a still more miserable lie than it was when a nineteenth-century piece of pulpit-wisdom.  

If in Germany the common citizen proved himself a beast, this has nothing to do with national peculiarities, but with the fact that bestiality itself, necrophilia, has become in the face of manifest abundance the attitude of the backward, the deluded philistine, that same ‘hard-done-by’ mentality which the master-morality was invented to combat.  

If Cesare Borgia, late 15th, were resurrected today, he would look like David Friedrich Strauss and his name would be Adolf Hitler.  The cause of amorality has been espoused by the same Darwinists whom Nietzsche despised, since evolution meant racism, and who proclaim as their maxim the barbaric struggle for existence with such  vehemence, even though it is no longer needed.  True distinction has long ceased to consist in taking the best for oneself, and has become instead saturated with taking, the practices in reality of the virtue of giving, for Nietzsche occurs only in the mind.  

Ascetic ideals constitute today a more solid bulwark against the madness of the profit-economy then did the hedonistic life sixty years ago against liberal repression.  The amoralist may now at last permit himself to be a kind, gentle, unegoistic and open-hearted as Nietzsche already was then.  As a guarantee of his undiminished resistance, he is still as alone in this as in the days when he turned the mask of evil upon the normal world, to teach fear of its own perversity.