Truth, Goodness and Facts

 Truth, Goodness and Facts

Horkheimer’s critique of Kant was over the assumption that the good brought happiness!   Kant believed that we must do our duty even if it meant every person on earth would suffer. Kant is a non-consequentialist and happiness, as well as suffering, are consequences. Kant does not care one whit about consequences, he cares about motives, intentions, good will; he cares about what happens BEFORE the action is performed, not about what happens after duty is fulfilled.

‘Good or happiness’ - many philosophers believe that “good” means happiness, which is not always clear cut. Good is too often a non-cognitive term - good cannot be perceived. And, good does not necessarily lead to happiness.

Truth also is vague. Truth as truth-telling is different from truth as factual. One can be telling the truth in terms of their emotional state of mind or consciously while being completely erroneous about the facts. But, many philosophers equate truth and rightness, that in being “right” they articulate the truth which is not appropriate. 

Truth may not require evidence. Truth may forever be unknown because of a lack of evidence or because reasoning cannot establish necessity. Knowledge requires evidence. According to the foremost epistemological theory, knowledge is "justified true belief." True belief alone is not sufficient for knowledge because one might hold a belief which is true by accident or coincidence. 

A "justification" usually involves the presentation of evidence.

The standard for truth is rationality which means that a truth or rightness claim is motivated by a justified, warranted and grounded consensus which includes the perspectives of all, hence rational. In other words, evidence is necessary.

There are preventions of nature’s wrath. Humans are part of nature, can understand nature and rationally control it. Humans can prevent catastrophes.

Truth adds values to 'facts.'  The term "fact" has two easily conflated meanings. The first is simply "true statement"; truth cannot be understood without redundancy. The second meaning can be compressed as "the way the world is," which includes objects, events, situations, etc., in the universe, including truths about an individual's state of mind: what a person knew about a state affairs at a given time and their intentions.

Truth addresses the accuracy, or adequacy of descriptions about facts. Truth includes several dilemmas beyond the fact-value difference. To explain an event or a happening - why it emerged and how to formulate it, truth must address both teleology or goal-directedness - how certain goals or aims determined or influenced the event, and causality, the causes, reasons and intentions that led to the effects and consequences. 

Formulating the truth about events or change involves interpretation and reinterpretations - properly attributing the teleological and causative elements of the event.

Destruction or Destructuring in Heidegger's Being and Time (1927)

 Destruction or Destructuring in Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) from p23

"In thus demonstrating the origin of our basic ontological concepts by an investigation in which their 'birth certificate' is displayed, we have nothing to do with a vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits; these in tum are given factically in the way the question is formulated at the time, and in the way the pouible field fOr investigation is thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at 'today' and at the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology, whether it is headed towards doxography, towards intellectual history, or towards a history of problems. But to bury the past in nullity [Nichtigkeit] is not the purpose of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect." Macquarrie translation 1962

"This demonstration of the provenance of the fundamental ontological concepts, as the investigation which displays their "birth certificate," has nothing to do with a pernicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. The destructuring has just as little the negative sense of disburdening ourselves of the ontological tradition. On the contrary, it should stake out the positive possibilities of the tradition, and that always means to fix its boundaries. These are factually given with the specific formulation of the question and the prescribed demarcation of the possible field of investigation. Negatively, the destructuring is not even related to the past: its criticism concerns "today" and the dominant way we treat the history of ontology, whether it be conceived as the history of opinions, ideas, or problems. However, the destructuring does not wish to bury the past in nullity; it has a positive intent. Its negative function remains tacit and indirect." Stambaugh translation 1996

The fundamental or elementary concepts were given just earlier by Heidegger as "Insofar as certain distinctive domains of being become visible in the course of this history and henceforth chiefly dominate the range of problems (Descartes' ego cogito, subject, the "I," reason, spirit, person), the beings just cited remain unquestioned with respect to thebeing and structure of their being, which indicates the thorough neglect of the question of being. This sort of list was also found in Nietzsche's "Twilight of the Idols" as unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being which catches us in error.