The Distinction Between Reason and Judgment
"In the Critique of Judgement, however, Kant insisted upon adifferent way of thinking, for which it would not be enough to be inagreement with one's own self, but which consisted of being able to"think in the place of everybody else" and which he therefore calledan "enlarged mentality" (erne erweiterte Denkungsart). Thepower of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, andthe thinking process which is active in judging something is not, likethe thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me andmyself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quitealone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communicationwith others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement.From this potential agreement judgment derives its specificvalidity. This means, on the one hand, that such judgment mustliberate itself from the "subjective private conditions," that is,from the idiosyncrasies which naturally determine the outlook ofeach individual in his privacy and are legitimate as long as they areonly privately held opinions, but which are not fit to enter themarket place, and lack all validity in the public realm, And this enlargedway of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcendits own individual limitations, on the other hand, cannot functionin strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others "inwhose place" it must think, whose perspectives it must take intoconsideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity toToperate at all. As logic, to be sound, depends on the presence of theself, so judgment, to be valid, depends on the presence of others.Hence judgment is endowed with a certain specific validity but isnever universally valid. Its claims to validity can never extendfurther than the others in whose place the judging person has puthimself for his considerations. Judgment, Kant says, is valid "forevery single judging person,"13 but the emphasis in the sentence ison "judging"; it is not valid for those who do not judge or forthose who are not members of the public realm where the objectsof judgment appear."
Excerpt from Hannah Arendt "Between Past and Future - The Crisis in Culture" p221
