Democracy is both a rational and an ethical practice. The value of inclusion is represented within democratic institutions more than any other form of political governance. Although democracy is valued especially by other democracies, two problems have emerged. The first problem is the rise of dictatorships, the most common political form today. Representation therefore is declining in relevance.
The second problem is the increasing degree of insurgency leading to Civil Wars and borders wars: examine African conflicts, Israeli conflicts, US-Mexican border, Korea, Pakistan, India, Syria, etc. This problem prompts alliance formation and counter-insurgency (COIN) arrangements between democracies, and often includes the states led by dictators, which are defended for the sake of stability, social and economic stability. Eisenhower defended US interventions with the excuse of mutual cooperation. Counter-insurgency policies are proliferating globally, for example, in the practices of militarization of police and the establishing of "low-intensity conflicts." Petreus rescaled the Iraqi debacle by reorganizing the tribal system which led to the formation of ISIL! The reason for the notion of "low-intensity" is to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, or biological and chemical weapons. If you don't think these are serious issues examine the international relations with N. Korea and Iran concerning nuclear weapons, Syria concerning chemical weapons (perhaps obtained from Iraq's Saddam Hussein who also used them, and the problem of epidemic outbreaks in Africa (Ebola) and Asia (Yemen - cholera). But, the response of democratic institutions like the UN both philanthropic and political has been slow. For example, for years the AIDS epidemic was denied and even after being recognized retroviral medicine was denied because it was not the cause for AIDS!.
The last 5 major wars involving the US: WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan/Iraq could be represented by the Nixon Doctrine - albeit that the secrecy behind US involvement in African Wars has yet to be unmasked. This bears examining because all of the issues we face today, and faced throughout the 20th, were presented by Nixon's Doctrine. Nixon stated in 1969 that how the war would end in S. Vietnam would have a great impact. If the US were described as losing the war, then isolationist and non-intervention would increase in US foreign policy with possible disastrous outcomes for many other nations. This reference to the widely discredited Domino Theory recalls the memory of Hitler's campaign or Stalin's subsequent initiatives. Nixon pointed out that if the US withdrew and became isolationist, no other nation would be under the illusion that the US would step-in, perhaps not even in the case of a large-scale attack. He said, "If a country can't handle its internal security, it is scarcely capable of being saved." Kissinger decried the ‘insidious model effect’ of democratically elected persons who would not follow US directives for resource allocations and instead improve human rights practices!
Nixon addressed the media by presenting the Vietnamization program: the withdrawal of troops coincident with the turning over of the war to the South Vietnamese. This involved drastic steps putting the US in a state of emergency (think Carl Schmidt and Giorgio Agamben) and massive bombing. It should be no surprise that military policy directives at one level get reflected at other levels. Large scale bombing of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was followed by frequent instances of mass murder on the ground in the attempt to identify infiltrators. This was clear after January 1973 when the US signed the Paris Peace Accords and the Khmer Rouge engaged in brutal repression, after the bombing of Kosovo in Sept 1995 followed by Serbs’ ethnic cleansing, and the murder of hundreds after the coup on Chile in 1975. The Nixon doctrine consisted of these kinds of contradictions during the paradoxical 'fighting with the intention of pulling out.' We see this today in Afghanistan/Iraq - the 2007 and 2010 surges represent temporary stays, and in the Korean stalemate. The Nixon doctrine promised to keep costs within limits and to alleviate concerns about an 'unending war' or 'forever war.' Aside form the significant problem of a permanent war footing, we should recognize that the US WWI intervention was because the war had gone on too long, the Vietnam intervention was initially to assist our ally, France, as was the Korean intervention. WWII and Afghanistan/Iraq could be said to be international responses to attacks against the US on US soil, but with the additional emphasis on rebuilding both the government and the infrastructures - by infrastructure I refer to things like buildings, plumbing and roads, and socio-political organization. This emphasis on regime change - Treaty of Versailles, post-WWII economic policies, is reflected in the Nixon Doctrine.
Developing the South Vietnamese' or Afghan or Iraqi capability to establish their own security was understood by Nixon to increase those nation's self-esteem, to deflate the antiwar protests in the US, and to bring the belligerent forces to the table. One important premise was that the US would continue to support S. Vietnam even after having withdrawn all forces. This plan was defeated however by the subsequent budget cuts to ordnance in support of South Vietnam. After the demise of South Vietnam, is it any wonder why the US continues to support Afghanistan/Iraq although the blunder of withdrawing in toto from Iraq and then having to re-enter without a skeleton force in place might be seen as a repetition of the Vietnamese quagmire - having left can we return? Obama’s solution to this problem was drone-warfare while ISIL started the 9 year Syrian Civil War including the 4 year Battle of Aleppo. Nixon wanted to reduce antiwar pressures at home, decrease the corruption of the South Vietnamese government/military, and ipresent to the enemy determined resolve to fight as long as necessary.
The key issue that the Nixon Doctrine turned on was control of appearances through the media. Nixon walked the tightrope of careful statements to the press about withdrawal and about staying the course. The 'credibility gap' that emerged was about the contradictory statements to the press and in private reassurances between leaders duly noted by many journalists. Nixon said, "We must trust each other." This same problem was reflected in the strong effort by the South Vietnamese and MACV to control journalist perceptions and communications. Isn't it obvious that the same dilemma is occurring during many conflicts today and around the Afghanistan/Iraq wars. For example, who understood any press reports or media explanations of the 2 Bosnian Wars, of the South Sudan crises or the African Civil Wars, of the Iraqi tribal arrangements or religious problems in forming a stable government, of international drug cartels, or the unrest and instability across the Magreb and Levant, of the nearly 80M migrants worldwide. Does the media present any explanations of the large scale migrations and refugee problem internationally? To what extent is the media unable or prevented from open discussion, and what effect does this have on violent conflicts?
The second problem is the increasing degree of insurgency leading to Civil Wars and borders wars: examine African conflicts, Israeli conflicts, US-Mexican border, Korea, Pakistan, India, Syria, etc. This problem prompts alliance formation and counter-insurgency (COIN) arrangements between democracies, and often includes the states led by dictators, which are defended for the sake of stability, social and economic stability. Eisenhower defended US interventions with the excuse of mutual cooperation. Counter-insurgency policies are proliferating globally, for example, in the practices of militarization of police and the establishing of "low-intensity conflicts." Petreus rescaled the Iraqi debacle by reorganizing the tribal system which led to the formation of ISIL! The reason for the notion of "low-intensity" is to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, or biological and chemical weapons. If you don't think these are serious issues examine the international relations with N. Korea and Iran concerning nuclear weapons, Syria concerning chemical weapons (perhaps obtained from Iraq's Saddam Hussein who also used them, and the problem of epidemic outbreaks in Africa (Ebola) and Asia (Yemen - cholera). But, the response of democratic institutions like the UN both philanthropic and political has been slow. For example, for years the AIDS epidemic was denied and even after being recognized retroviral medicine was denied because it was not the cause for AIDS!.
The last 5 major wars involving the US: WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan/Iraq could be represented by the Nixon Doctrine - albeit that the secrecy behind US involvement in African Wars has yet to be unmasked. This bears examining because all of the issues we face today, and faced throughout the 20th, were presented by Nixon's Doctrine. Nixon stated in 1969 that how the war would end in S. Vietnam would have a great impact. If the US were described as losing the war, then isolationist and non-intervention would increase in US foreign policy with possible disastrous outcomes for many other nations. This reference to the widely discredited Domino Theory recalls the memory of Hitler's campaign or Stalin's subsequent initiatives. Nixon pointed out that if the US withdrew and became isolationist, no other nation would be under the illusion that the US would step-in, perhaps not even in the case of a large-scale attack. He said, "If a country can't handle its internal security, it is scarcely capable of being saved." Kissinger decried the ‘insidious model effect’ of democratically elected persons who would not follow US directives for resource allocations and instead improve human rights practices!
Nixon addressed the media by presenting the Vietnamization program: the withdrawal of troops coincident with the turning over of the war to the South Vietnamese. This involved drastic steps putting the US in a state of emergency (think Carl Schmidt and Giorgio Agamben) and massive bombing. It should be no surprise that military policy directives at one level get reflected at other levels. Large scale bombing of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was followed by frequent instances of mass murder on the ground in the attempt to identify infiltrators. This was clear after January 1973 when the US signed the Paris Peace Accords and the Khmer Rouge engaged in brutal repression, after the bombing of Kosovo in Sept 1995 followed by Serbs’ ethnic cleansing, and the murder of hundreds after the coup on Chile in 1975. The Nixon doctrine consisted of these kinds of contradictions during the paradoxical 'fighting with the intention of pulling out.' We see this today in Afghanistan/Iraq - the 2007 and 2010 surges represent temporary stays, and in the Korean stalemate. The Nixon doctrine promised to keep costs within limits and to alleviate concerns about an 'unending war' or 'forever war.' Aside form the significant problem of a permanent war footing, we should recognize that the US WWI intervention was because the war had gone on too long, the Vietnam intervention was initially to assist our ally, France, as was the Korean intervention. WWII and Afghanistan/Iraq could be said to be international responses to attacks against the US on US soil, but with the additional emphasis on rebuilding both the government and the infrastructures - by infrastructure I refer to things like buildings, plumbing and roads, and socio-political organization. This emphasis on regime change - Treaty of Versailles, post-WWII economic policies, is reflected in the Nixon Doctrine.
Developing the South Vietnamese' or Afghan or Iraqi capability to establish their own security was understood by Nixon to increase those nation's self-esteem, to deflate the antiwar protests in the US, and to bring the belligerent forces to the table. One important premise was that the US would continue to support S. Vietnam even after having withdrawn all forces. This plan was defeated however by the subsequent budget cuts to ordnance in support of South Vietnam. After the demise of South Vietnam, is it any wonder why the US continues to support Afghanistan/Iraq although the blunder of withdrawing in toto from Iraq and then having to re-enter without a skeleton force in place might be seen as a repetition of the Vietnamese quagmire - having left can we return? Obama’s solution to this problem was drone-warfare while ISIL started the 9 year Syrian Civil War including the 4 year Battle of Aleppo. Nixon wanted to reduce antiwar pressures at home, decrease the corruption of the South Vietnamese government/military, and ipresent to the enemy determined resolve to fight as long as necessary.
The key issue that the Nixon Doctrine turned on was control of appearances through the media. Nixon walked the tightrope of careful statements to the press about withdrawal and about staying the course. The 'credibility gap' that emerged was about the contradictory statements to the press and in private reassurances between leaders duly noted by many journalists. Nixon said, "We must trust each other." This same problem was reflected in the strong effort by the South Vietnamese and MACV to control journalist perceptions and communications. Isn't it obvious that the same dilemma is occurring during many conflicts today and around the Afghanistan/Iraq wars. For example, who understood any press reports or media explanations of the 2 Bosnian Wars, of the South Sudan crises or the African Civil Wars, of the Iraqi tribal arrangements or religious problems in forming a stable government, of international drug cartels, or the unrest and instability across the Magreb and Levant, of the nearly 80M migrants worldwide. Does the media present any explanations of the large scale migrations and refugee problem internationally? To what extent is the media unable or prevented from open discussion, and what effect does this have on violent conflicts?
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